State of Utah v. Julio Godinez : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
State of Utah v. Julio Godinez : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
Elizabeth A. Bowman; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Godinez, No. 880301 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1082
CUMENT 
U 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CKETNO MQW-QA , 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : 
vs. : 
JULIO GODINEZ : Case No. 880301-CA 
Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a conviction and judgment of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
second degree felony, in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable John A. Rokich, 
Judge, presiding. 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East Fifth South 
Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
Ill "lit" i DIJIi Ii" '" "' 'iPPHALS OF T H E S T A T E O F UTAH 
THE S T A T E 
.:, Respondent 
: Case No. 880301- CA 
Category N< :>„ 2 
Defendant/Appe1Iant i 
B R I E F O F A P P E L L A N T 
A p [ J*1'-'J I l i i i ill i in " in i I 11 i n I in in III I I in I • 4 in* ' i l l 11II 11 in II \ w \ mi L 
Possess, nt a Controlled Substance wii-h Intent to Distribute, a 
second deqree felony, in the Third Judirial District c u n t in did 
I ' i in mi I , nil i l I ' 11 I HI ill I I mi i n in a b l e 11 j ih i j I o k i c h , 
Judge
 r ^ © s i d i n g . 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN 
Salt Lake Legal Defe* ;-
424 East Fifth Sout" 
Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
A11 orney for Appe11ant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
A11 o r n e y f o r R e s p o n d e n t 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT iv. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES V. 
TEXT OF STATUTES vi. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
MR. GODINEZ OF POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. . . 4 
CONCLUSION 9 
ii. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
CASES CITED 
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983) 8 
State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72 (Utah 1981) 6, 7 
State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985). 5, 6, 1, 8 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) 5, 9 
State v. Sery, No. 860333-CA (July 27, 1988) 7, 8 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 6 
iii. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e) whereby a defendant in a district court criminal 
action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final 
judgment of conviction of any crime other than a first degree 
felony. Mr. Godinez was convicted of a second degree felony. The 
Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah rendered final judgment and 
conviction. (Addendum A). 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to convict Mr, Godinez of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute? 
v. 
TEXT OF STATUTES 
§58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (1953 as amended). 
Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this 
chapter, it is unlawful for any 
person to knowingly and inten-
tentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or 
dispense, or to possess with 
intent to produce, manufacture, 
or dispense, a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
. . . 
(b) Any person convicted of violating 
subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in 
Schedule I or II is guilty of a 
second degree felony. . . . 
vi. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent : 
vs. : 
JULIO GODINEZ : Case No. 880301-CA 
Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Julio Godinez appeals from a judgment and 
conviction of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (1953 as amended). Mr. Godinez was convicted on 
March 25, 1988, following a jury trial. He was sentenced May 9, 
1988, by the Honorable John A. Rokich of the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County. Private counsel was allowed to 
withdraw the same day, and the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
was appointed May 10, 1988, to represent Mr. Godinez in his appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 9, 1987, Detective William McCarthy conducted 
surveillance on the Motel 6 located at Sixth South, 200 East in Salt 
Lake City (T. 72-73). He arrived about 3:15 p.m. and observed at 
least two people inside Room 223 (T. 78). About one hour later, two 
people, later identified as Mr. Godinez and Fernando left Room 223, 
walked around the building and entered Room 225 (T. 78, 80). The 
two remained in Room 225 for about seven minutes, then both returned 
to Room 223 (T. 84-86). About a half an hour later, John Pender (an 
informant) and Pablo LaFarga went to Room 223 (T. 86-87). LaFarga 
carried a brown paper bag (T. 87). They were there about one minute 
when Mr. Godinez and Fernando left and again returned to Room 225 
but did not enter the room (T. 88-89). Mr. Godinez went to a car, 
possibly for a key to the room, then both men entered Room 225 (T. 
89-91). 
Pender then arrived alone and entered Room 223 (T. 91). 
About ten minutes later, Mr. Godinez and Fernando left Room 225 and 
entered Room 223 (T. 92). They were there only minutes when Pender 
left (T. 92). About twenty minutes later, Mr. Godinez and Fernando 
left Room 223 and returned to Room 225 (T. 92). Fernando carried 
something in his coat which the surveillance officer could readily 
observe from a distance of about two hundred feet (T. 90, 92, 175). 
Five or six minutes later, Mr. Godinez left Room 225 and returned 
nine minutes later (T. 93). Fernando was alone in Room 225 at the 
time (T. 136). The officer lost track of Mr. Godinez during this 
time. J^ 3. About one hour later, LaFarga exited Room 223 only to 
pace on the balcony and return to Room 223 (T. 93-94). Pender 
arrived and went to Room 223 and eventually left with LaFarga (T. 
94). Pender had called to Room 223 when Mr. Godinez was not there 
and later went to Room 223 when Mr. Godinez was not there to arrange 
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drug transactions (T. 188-91). LaFarga was eventually arrested (T. 
200) after arranging a drug deal with the informant and did not 
return to the Motel (T. 193-200). 
Following the drug deal with LaFarga, officers began work 
to obtain a warrant to search the motel (T. 200). Meanwhile, the 
surveillance officer had called for back-up because he became 
nervous when Mr. Godinez and Fernando walked outside. Mr. Godinez 
walked up to the van and attempted to look inside while Fernando 
walked back and forth in the shadows (T. 95-96, 99). 
The surveillance officer and another officer entered Room 
225 with a passkey (T. 100). Mr. Godinez was alone in the room, 
sitting on a bed by the door (T. 101). He was patted down, but no 
weapons were found (T. 101-103). Once the warrant arrived, the room 
was searched. Mr. Godinezfs coat was searched and a ring display 
box with rings inside was found (T. 105). The bed he was on was 
"tossed" by the police and a plastic bag was found which contained 
approximately one pound of cocaine (T. 107-108, 182). A bindle of a 
different strength of cocaine was found in a cup in the bathroom 
(T. 157, 182). Scales were found in Room 223 (T. 206). Miguel 
Jiminez and Fernando were arrested in Room 223 (T. 140, 215-16). 
Cocaine was found in Jiminez's jacket (T. 215-16). 
Although his English was not fluent, Mr. Godinez 
communicated to the police he was a jewelry salesman and denied 
having any knowledge of the drugs (T. 132, 149, 151, 168-69). He 
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indicated the people in Room 223 were supposed to find buyers for 
his jewelry (T. 152). Mr. Godinez said he had been in Salt Lake 
City three days but had not met any customers yet and was thinking 
of returning to Los Angeles (T. 169). Also found were three airline 
passes in Mr Godinez's name (T. 153, 169), round trip from Los 
Angeles to Salt Lake via Tucson (T. 154). 
Neither the plastic bag of cocaine nor the bindle found 
in Room 225 were processed for fingerprints (T. 217). Likewise the 
police never checked Mr. Godinez's blood for cocaine levels, nor did 
they check his hands for cocaine residue (T. 218). The Motel rooms 
were registered to Perez and Jiminez (T. 221). Registration 
receipts showed two keys had been check out for Room 225 (T. 223). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury erroneously convicted Mr. Godinez on 
insufficient evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
MR. GODINEZ OF POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. 
As indicated above, Mr. Godinez claimed he knew nothing 
about the drugs found in his room at the motel (T. 168). He had 
only come to Salt Lake City to meet customers who would assist him 
in his jewelry business (T. 152, 169). The informant who worked for 
the police could not implicate Mr. Godinez but only the men Mr. 
Godinez was with (T. 186, 197, 214-16). Officers found no drugs on 
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Mr* Godinez or in his immediate possession and were aware he shared 
his room at the motel with another at least some of the time 
(T. 84, 91, 105). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 
444 (Utah 1983) set forth the standard for reversing a conviction on 
insufficient evidence: 
In considering that question, we review the 
evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. We 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. 
In State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985) the Court 
reversed the conviction of Clive Fox on possession with intent to 
distribute and production of a controlled substance for insufficient 
evidence. As indicated in Fox, a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute requires proof of two 
elements: "(1) that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed 
a controlled substance, and (2) that defendant intended to 
distribute the controlled substance to another." Ld. at 318 citing 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1953 as amended). 
The Court in Fox indicated "actual physical possession 
presupposes knowing and intentional possession". jrd. Constructive 
possession, on the other hand, can exist "where the contraband is 
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subject to [defendant's] dominion and control." _Id. at 319 citing 
State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981). More importantly, 
the Court stated, "persons who might know of the whereabouts of 
illicit drugs and who might even have access to them, but who have 
no intent to obtain and use the drugs can not be convicted of 
possession of a controlled substance." i^d. at 319. The Court 
continued, "[k]nowledge and ability to possess do not equal 
possession where there is no evidence of intent to make use of that 
knowledge and ability." j^ d. To prove a nexus sufficient to support 
a conviction, the state must prove the defendant "had both the power 
and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug." Id. 
in establishing that nexus, the Court indicated a case by 
case analysis should control. Ownership or occupancy of the 
premises is one factor, but that alone is not "sufficient to 
establish constructive possession, especially when occupancy is not 
exclusive." Ij3. There is no dispute Mr. Godinez occupied the room 
in which the drugs were found, but he did not occupy it alone and he 
was outside of the room at a time when Fernando was in the room 
alone (T. 136). Fernando had been seen carrying something in his 
coat into the room (T. 90, 92) and Mr. Godinez was never seen 
carrying anything into the room. 
Another factor to consider is incriminating statements 
made by the accused, according to the Court in Fox. Fox at 319. Mr. 
Godinez always maintained his innocence and never made any 
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incriminating statements (T. 151-52, 168-69). A third factor which 
might be indicative of dominion and control is incriminating 
behavior. Mr. Godinez1 behavior was described in various terms by 
the various officers present. Officer McCarthy testified Mr. 
Godinez was "relaxed," (T. 130-31), "complacent," (i^.) and "nice." 
(T. 132). At trial, McCarthy testified Mr. Godinez became 
incontinent during the search (T. 109) but McCarthy made no mention 
of this behavior at Mr. Godinez1 preliminary hearing (T. 140). 
Officer Bernards indicated Mr. Godinez showed "surprise" when the 
cocaine was found (T. 167) and further testified Mr. Godinez was 
"extremely nervous" and "up and down from his chair." J^ d. Bernards 
also thought Mr. Godinez showed "dismay." Id. 
As this Court recently indicated in State v. Sery, No. 
860333-CA (July 27, 1988), "nervousness" which police may think is a 
significant indication the actor is involved in criminal activity is 
"the most subjective of the characteristics comprising the formal 
[drug courier] profiles." Id. at 15-17. Even if it could be 
determined Mr. Godinez had been nervous, one must ask if any 
individual sitting alone in a motel room invaded by police would not 
also exhibit nervousness. It cannot be said that nervous behavior 
in this context could be any indication of guilt. 
The State also attempted to attach some significance to 
Mr. Godinez use of his middle (or hyphenated) name on the airline 
-7 -
tickets (T. 153-54/ 169-70). There was no evidence to support any 
indication the name Mr. Godinez used inferred he had dominion and 
control over the drugs. 
Another factor considered by the Court in Fox was the 
"presence of drugs in a specific area over which the accused had 
control." Fox at 319. Although Mr. Godinez was indeed on the bed 
where the drugs were found, Fernando had been alone in the room 
before the police entered. There was no indication Mr. Godinez was 
attempting to hide the drugs by where he sat — indeed quite the 
opposite. He was not attempting to sit by the headboard where the 
drugs were eventually discovered. The surveillance officer 
confirmed Mr. Godinez was not the sole occupant of the room. 
The fourth factor considered in Fox was the "presence of 
drug paraphernalia among the accused's personal effects". Fox at 
319. The only drug paraphernalia found were the scales located in 
Room 223 where Mr. Godinez was not staying. State v. Fox concluded 
the facts must indicate an accused "intended to use drugs as his or 
her own" to support a conviction. _Id. at 319. 
in State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered a similar case and reversed the conviction 
as to the defendant's wife because that conviction was premised on 
her joint occupation and ownership of the defendant's home. Mr. 
Anderton claimed his wife knew nothing about the drugs. Ij3. at 
1262. The Court concluded the evidence was insufficient to sustain 
her conviction. Id. at 1263. 
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
jury verdict as required by State v. Petree, it cannot be said the 
evidence in the case at bar supports the conviction against Mr. 
Godinez. Mere presence in a room shared by another when drugs were 
found is insufficient evidence to show even constructive possession 
or control. The State presented no other evidence which pointed to 
knowledge or control. Therefore, Mr. Godinez1 conviction ought to 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons Mr. Godinez asks this Court to 
reverse his conviction for insufficient evidence and to remand his 
case for dismissal of the charge. ^riK^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS / / day of September, 
1988. 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN 
Attorney for Appellant 
r 
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I, ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN, hereby certify that eight copies 
of the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 
South 500 East, Suite 300 Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102, and four 
copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City,Utah, 84114, this J£ 'h day of September, 1988. 
DELIVERED by 
September, 1988. 
day of 
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ADDENDUM A 
MAY i ,j ]988 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT <• 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF lfr&Wr+^~X^^;uyt.court 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ^ p u f % e * r * 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff.
 v (COMMITMENT) 
vs. g^Lr ' c°-N°^ 
Case No. C/t- <?<f- C±' 
-!*-fl-' 
—\] £L*>itsr74*. \ Honorable 
~ * (^<U$ ( Clerk fJm.rt.^cYm ~ 
Reporter^ 
Bailiff ^^j^Arr 5£r?f*<y 
Defendant. ' Date ^ / / ^ / «? / ? < / ^ 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted b/ S ^ jury; D the court; D plpa of guilty; 
• plea olhio contest; of the offense of ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ a felony 
of the**? - degree, Q a class misdemeanor, feeing now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by)Z _ and the State being represented by -T- ftj**^- is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
H of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• not to exceed years; 
H^and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of %/OjfiOO*0^ 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with — — 
n>upon motion of • State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
la Commitment shall issue V/y^^Ji^y^T^ 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
t/fa/MW
DATED this /& day of M^y,^ ^SJT f 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
Defense Counsel H^rnxON HINOLEY 
CLERK 
— BY ;^^T— r- i / 
Deputy County Attorney / ^ P ^ / <*<«* page / -^rt J^ 
